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Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations.
Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades.
Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
- Sales Rank: #844441 in eBooks
- Published on: 2014-11-02
- Released on: 2014-11-02
- Format: Kindle eBook
Review
One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 2015
"This bold, well-written, and landmark work draws together the fields of international political economy and security studies. It also illuminates modern international history and the future."--Choice
"[A] landmark book."--Foreign Affairs
"[A] stimulating and penetrating book. . . . A landmark contribution to the ongoing debate on the relationship between interdependence and peace."--Jack Snyder, International Security
"Exhaustively researched. . . . Copeland is a rarity among contemporary international relations scholars."--Erik Gartzke, Political Science Quarterly
"Economic Interdependence and War is international relations on a gigantic scale. Copeland asks big questions, makes big arguments, engages big alternatives, and tests them all on big powers over a big time span. . . . Books like this one are a healthy reminder that there remains trenchant things to say about the big picture. . . . A work of passion, conviction, and erudition."--Joseph Parent, Perspective on Politics
From the Back Cover
"A landmark study, Economic Interdependence and War presents a novel and compelling argument about trade expectations and the prospects for peace and war among the great powers. This well-written and accessible book buttresses its argument with an extraordinarily valuable historical analysis of great-power interactions from the 1790s to the present day, and a superior intellectual engagement of the quantitative literature."--Joseph Grieco, Duke University
"Economic Interdependence and War is an extraordinary accomplishment. This magisterial work, by one of the leading scholars of international relations, brings together theory, history, and quantitative data to demonstrate the critical role economic relations play in the 'high politics' of war and peace. The evidence Copeland produces is fascinating and his argument is provocative and forceful."--Michael Mastanduno, Dartmouth College
"This impressive and important book has a serious historical backbone, a relentlessly analytical approach, and grand theoretical ambition. It joins the canon of books in international relations that explore the crucial questions arising from the intersection of international security and international political economy."--Timothy Crawford, Boston College
"Making big arguments about theory, methodology, and history, this bold and original book will be controversial and widely argued over. It is certain to be adopted for classroom use and generate lots of research, engaging security-oriented political scientists, those interested in international political economy, as well as economically and diplomatically minded historians." --Francis J. Gavin, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
About the Author
Dale C. Copeland is an associate professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of The Origins of Major War.
Most helpful customer reviews
7 of 8 people found the following review helpful.
Interesting narrative on causal variables to many major conflicts of the last 200 years
By A. Menon
Economic Interdependence and War attempts to show how many current theories of economic and interdependence are inadequate and need to incorporate the dimension of future expectations as a variable to be more complete. To many this might seem obvious but apparently there are academics who don't believe that forward expectations have a relevance in determining probabilities of conflict (I am a skeptic of this assertion). Many different theories have been proposed over time relating trade levels to probabilities of conflict. There are liberal theorists claiming that higher levels of trade decrease the likelihood of war as perceptions of mutual benefit get in the way of domestic belligerence and as a consequence trade overlap helps silence domestic pathologies. There are also economic realists who believe that overlapping trade will increase the likelihood of conflict as zero sum calculations of a resource base lead to desire for military dominance. The author goes through many conflicts from the Napoleonic Wars through the Cold War and analyzes the factors that went into leaders calculus when making strategic decisions. His narrative weighs heavily in favor of the idea that leaders expectations of the future economic relationship was a primary variable that the leaders focused on.
The book is split into 9 chapters. The first two are introductory with the author outlining the trend in economics to try to figure out causal variables of conflict through regression on economic statistics. Such an approach, though interesting does not lead to much insight and correlation and causation are not the same thing. The author discusses how such statistical approaches lead to different results based on how one conditions the data set and the author argues that expectations of the future cant be incorporated into the framework via regression. The author gives an overview of the cases he will analyze which effectively span 200 years and gives a short note on which theory is effective in is view.
The chronology of case studies is a bit weird in that the author starts with the Russo Japanese war at the turn of the 19th century and then the German perspective through world war I and II. The need for resource scarce nations like Japan and Germany to secure resources is determined to be the key variable that drove the countries to war. Both countries, the author argues, saw a relative decline as they saw themselves shut out from what they saw as closed trading blocks from the rest of the developing world. Such fears led to the need for territorial expansion and in the case of Germany feelings of isolation between growing superpowers. The threat of Russian encroachment was of categorical importance to both Japan and Germany in the wars the author dissects. The incorporation of the trade expectations theory is an argument contrary to many of the narratives given over WWI where it was a colossal coordination failure.
The author moves on to Sino-Japanese relations, Japanese Russian relations as well as Pearl Harbour. Similar to the Sino-Russian war, Japanese Industrial growth is described as needing Manchuria as well as safety of US oil supplies. Dominance over Korea and Manchuria is shown to be a constant source of tension between Russia and Korea who both see the region as their sphere of influence. As well the civil war in China led to a power vacuum that the Japanese were quick to fill the power gap given their valuable holdings and industrial capital stock that had been built. A difficult trade relationship with the US finally forced the Japanese to take action as perceptions about a future deal or lack thereof solidified. The long history of Japan presence as well as its need to hold a sphere of influence led to lack of credibility on Japan exiting Manchuria. The author argues that the inability to trust that Japan would not attack Russia if the Nazis were successful on the western front made it impossible to develop trade relationship trust with Japan which needed US resources to remain stable. Hence the situation spiraled as deteriorating trade expectations created diplomatic roadblocks that eventually led to war. The author spends a lot of time on the Japanese intentions in China and that they were a drain on the army and that Japan was interested in extricating itself from the situation but needed to hold Manchuria as a resource base. There is an interesting historical perspective that the reader will get.
The author then moves on to the Cold War. The strategic uncertainty of the superpowers is discussed as the primary variable that led to hostilities. In particular though there was a desire for increased trade, especially by the Soviet Union, perceptions about the other nations led to an inability to develop ties based on trust. The author describes the waves of Soviet economic foreign policy and how different leaders went through different phases and the author notes that with Nixon and Reagan trade expectations was a positive factor while with Truman and Eisenhower it was a background factor. The cold war is an example the author incorporates into his expectations theory but focuses on the strategic uncertainty that made expectations highly risk averse.
The author finally discusses the colonial period which he breaks up into two chapters. He first discusses the Napoleonic Wars and Crimean War and discusses how perceptions of how mercantilist economic policies would impact various countries differently led to the wars of the early 19th century. The author notes that though unit level forces of rulers like Napoleon and Nicholas were a part of the catalyst to war, they had expectations at the core of their actions. Again the historical narrative is interesting but unless the leader was insane, to claim that their reasoning was behind the actions was based on expectations is almost a tautology. The author moves into the colonial grab in the late 19th century and shows how it was deteriorating trade expectations among nations as their mercantilist blocks were forming that led to land grabs. The author also describes the opium wars as a function of the need for the trade triangle between Britain, India and China.
I enjoyed this book for its historical narrative to some extremely important conflicts that have occurred over the last 200 years. The evidence presented is detailed and the story woven is well thought out. There is no question that expectations have an important part of a theory of conflict and historical data and snapshot statistics alone will not be sufficient to construct a probability measure for war. However that as an idea isn't particularly deep or contentious from a common sense standpoint and though I am sure there will be some heated debate by experts about some details, the incorporation of actors ideas about the future is obvious in the codifying of strategic interaction. Bayesian game theory is clearly not oblivious to this idea. The history is strong but the economics is often weak. Given that I enjoyed the history this much though, I thought for that alone it should be read with interest.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
Trade and War: A New Theoretical Construct
By Eric Gartman
Scholars studying the effects of trade and war have come to opposite conclusions: Some argue that more trade lessens the probability of war as states become economically interdependent, while others argue that the threat of vulnerability makes war more likely. Professor Dale Copeland of the University of Virginia seeks to resolve this debate in this latest work. His answer is that when states have positive expectations of future trade, they will opt for peace, but if they view future trade expectations negatively, they will choose war to gain the necessary resources before they are denied them by their trading partners. Using this rubric, Copeland traces numerous instances of trade between great powers beginning in 1790 and ending in 1991, some of which resulted in war, other which were resolved peacefully. Among his findings is the salience of economic issues to the security policies of the great powers of the centuries. In realist thought, economic issues are important as a key factor in a state’s overall power. Therefore, a strong economy is a prerequisite for state power; any threat to state power must be dealt with by force if necessary. In this sense it is not surprising for a realist that economic issues are important. What Copeland brings out is the regularity of their significance in international relations history, on par with military and security issues. The many case studies he uses consistently show the utility of his theory of trade expectations over traditional realist and liberal views. The case studies are well-written and well-supported; readers will likely learn quite a bit about several historical events they may not have been familiar with, such as the Crimean War, the Boer War, and the Fashoda crisis.
An interesting counter to the view presented here is John Mearsheimer’s in the “Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. Mearsheimer argues that war is caused by growing power inequalities between major powers. Whereas Copeland declares the cause of World Wars 1 and 2 was declining German expectations of trade with Britain and France, Mearsheimer would probably counter that the reason that Britain and France initiated trade restrictions on Germany in the first place was due to their fear of growing German power. Trade restrictions for Mearsheimer are caused by fears of a growing power, and it is the growing power that initiates war to achieve regional hegemony, whereas for Copeland trade restrictions can be a cause of war alone as a state seeks to stem decline and keep its place in the international order. These difference aren’t huge but they are noteworthy. These differing perspective lead both authors to come to opposite conclusions regarding the future of the US and China. Copeland argues that China will have positive future trade expectations as a restrictive containment policy will be very hard to implement as they are well-integrated in the world economy. Yet Mearsheimer may counter that if China’ growth makes them a threat to others, such a policy of containment will follow inevitably regardless of current levels of trade. It would be helpful if these two academic titans engaged in a debate that lays out, and possibly reconcile their positions.
Overall, this is an excellent follow-up to Copeland’s previous work on major war, in which he introduced his concept of future expectations as a key factor in leader’s decision-making process. While that work focused on military-security issues, this one applies the same concept to trade-security issues. Perhaps in his next work Dr. Copeland will fuse the two together for an even more comprehensive theory of international relations.
2 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
Very thorough
By Sam Seitz
This was a well-researched and thoroughly investigated book. It has a number of deep case studies that not only work to demonstrate Copeland's thesis but also provides novel historical outlooks and refutations of some commonly held assumptions about state action in history. However, for an academic book, it did seem to have an abnormally large number of typos and mistakes (like repeatedly discussing aspects of the Crimean war occurring in 1953). Despite these cosmetic mistakes, it's definitely a worthwhile read.
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